Deep learning has been widely studied in many technical domains such as image analysis and speech recognition, with its benefits that effectively deal with complex and high-dimensional data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Keeping the network secure from cyber-attacks has long been an important concern in computer networks. However, we see a growing number of malware and cyber-attacks year by year. In addition, new emerging attacks are much more critical than ever showing greater impacts. For instance, a ransomware attack (''WannaCry'') encrypted files in the victim machines across 10,000 organizations causing a significant financial loss in 2017 [1] . Another critical incident reported in 2016 was by DDoS attacks which hit large datacenters, and Twitter and Spotify temporarily closed down the sites due to the attack [2] . Cyber-attacks could be more severe with the increasing use of mobile and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. An incident reported that hundreds of thousands of compromised IoT devices were employed to make a DDoS attack [3] .
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chi-Yuan Chen . Anomaly detection is one of the crucial functions in network security, which identifies malicious and unexpected activities from the network traffic. With the remarkable advances in the past several years, machine learning has been widely studied to identify anomalies in the network [4] - [9] . However, our preliminary experiments showed that conventional machine learning is largely limited with sometimes unacceptable accuracy in detection when analyzing network data which are often complex and high-dimensional. For example, we observed no better than 83% accuracy with several machine learning techniques such as Adaboosting, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF), against the NSL-KDD dataset [10] , which is widely used for evaluating network anomaly detection functions [5] , [6] , [11] - [16] . From the experiment against another public dataset of UNSW-NB15 [17] , the result shows less than 91% of detection accuracy with the above learning methods.
The root reason of the limitation of conventional learning is that such techniques are not effective to deal with the high complex data. In fact, we observed a significant degree of non-linearity from public network data from our preliminary experiments, which motivates us to explore deep learning structures for network anomaly detection. Deep learning is known to be powerful to deal with complex data with the property of non-linearity [18] , [19] . While deep learning has been applied for a variety of applications such as image processing and natural language processing [20] , [21] , it has not been thoroughly examined for the application of network anomaly detection. Our past survey work [22] also shows that using deep learning for network data analysis is still in the initial stage and the evaluation studies were limited with only a few datasets such as NSL-KDD.
In this paper, we design and evaluate a set of deep learning models established based on Fully Connected Network (FCN) [23] , Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) [24] , and Sequence-to-Sequence (Seq2Seq) [25] - [27] structures. For thorough evaluation, we employ a variety of datasets with different characteristics: NSL-KDD [10] , Kyoto-Honeypot [28] , UNSW-NB15 [17] , IDS2017 [29] , and MAWILab traces [30] . Our experimental results with the aforementioned traces confirm the potential of the evaluated deep learning models for network anomaly detection, with the significantly improved performance compared to conventional shallow learning techniques. In particular, the detection model based on the Seq2Seq structure with LSTM cells shows the highly promising performance, yielding over 99% of detection accuracy against the datasets employed.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We demonstrate the complexity of the network traffic datasets, explaining why conventional shallow learning would not be adequate for identifying network anomalies.
• We present the deep learning models designed for network anomaly detection based on FCN, VAE, and Seq2Seq structures, with the basic concepts of the learning structures.
• We conduct extensive experiments for the thorough evaluation of the deep learning models with the various datasets (NSL-KDD, Kyoto-Honeypot, UNSW-NB15, IDS 2017, and MAWILab), and report our observations with the implications of the experimental results. The organization of this paper is as follows. We first introduce a summary of the past studies and the description of the public datasets, along with the discussion of the motivation of this work in Section II. In Section III, we present the design of deep learning models based on the FCN, VAE, and Seq2Seq structures. We next evaluate the deep learning models with the extensive set of public network data in Section IV. Finally, we conclude our presentation in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the complexity of network traffic data that may eliminate shallow learning from the consideration for the effective detection of anomalies. We then summarize the closely related studies and describe the datasets employed in the evaluation.
A. WHY DEEP LEARNING FOR NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION?
In the preliminary experiment, we examined conventional learning techniques including Adaboosting, SVM, and RF to see how well they are working to identify network anomalies. Table 1 shows the detection accuracy using the conventional learning methods against the NSL-KDD dataset. For this experiment, the default setting was used without fine-tuning. The result shows less than 83% of accuracy, which may not be acceptable in practice. Note that the description of the datasets can be found in Section II-C.
To see why, we analyzed the distribution of the data points using t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE), a tool to effectively visualize high-dimensional data. Figure 1 demonstrates the distributions of normal and attack data points for different datasets of NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15. The t-SNE plots in the figure show that the two different classes of data (normal and attack) share the same feature space. This indicates that discriminating attacks from the normal data points would be significantly challenging.
Deep learning is powerful enough to deal with the data with non-linearity [19] , which motivates us to examine deep learning methods for network anomaly detection. In this work, we will present the construction of deep learning models to improve the detection performance with an extensive evaluation with a diverse set of network traffic data.
B. RELATED WORK
Our past survey work [22] investigated the use of deep learning for network anomaly detection, and the conclusion was that using deep learning in network traffic analysis is still in the initial stage and the evaluation studies were limited with only a few datasets such as NSL-KDD. In this section, we briefly introduce the closely related studies employed deep learning techniques for network anomaly detection.
The work in [11] utilized a Deep Neural Network (DNN) for flow-based anomaly detection in a Software Defined Networking (SDN) environment. Note that the main concept of SDN is to decompose the architecture into the network control and forwarding functions. By doing so, the network control and underlying infrastructure can be programmable and abstracted, respectively for applications and network services. In the proposed SDN security architecture, the intrusion detection module is implemented in the SDN controller to monitor Open-Flow switches. The designed model employs a simple deep neural network consisting of one input layer, three hidden layers, and one output layer. The evaluation was conducted using the NSL-KDD dataset. The authors reported 75% of classification accuracy as the best performance against the NSL-KDD dataset. One reason for the poor performance would be from the use of a small subset of the features (six out of 41 features) for training and testing. Hyper parameters used in the experiments are: number of inputs = 6 features, number of hidden nodes = {3, 6, 12}, number of outputs = 2, batch size = 10, learning rate = {1e-01, 1e-02, 1e-03, 1e-04}, and epochs = 100.
The authors in [15] combined spectral clustering and neural networks (DNN) for multi-classification for intrusion detection. In the training phase, the clustering groups the given dataset and the data points for each group are used to train the associated DNN. Similarly, the clustering is applied to the testing dataset and then the data points in each group are fed into the DNN for that group. Finally, the output of the DNNs is aggregated to make the final decision. Using the KDDCup 1999 data with five classes (Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L), the authors show that the proposed technique works slightly better than the conventional learning methods including SVM and random forest. However, the reported accuracy is not acceptable showing lower than 80% accuracy for three classes (Probe, U2R, and R2L).
In [14] , the authors set up an intrusion detection model based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). Since CNN models often take two-or three-dimensional data as input (e.g., images), the authors converted the NSL-KDD connection record into a 8 × 8 gray-scale pixel image using the one-hot encoding and binning technique. Then the authors simply employed the existing CNN models, ResNet 50 and GoogLeNet, for learning and testing. The observed accuracy against NSL-KDD is not that promising showing less than 82% of accuracy.
In addition, another work in [31] introduced a deep learning approach based on a simple Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) with forward and back propagations, for network intrusion detection. The authors reported F-measure of 68%-99% as the binary classification accuracy against the NSL-KDD datasets. A recent study [13] set up a deep learning model using Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBMs) for network anomaly detection. The authors evaluated their deep learning model using NSL-KDD and reported 91% of accuracy. Additionally, the RBM-based model has also been evaluated with the UNSW-NB15 dataset [17] containing 49 features with the class label, and the authors showed their technique works slightly better than shallow learning techniques (proposed = 95.8% and random forest = 94.4% of accuracy).
Additionally, the authors in [32] examined the Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) with both Contrastive Divergence (CD) and Persistent Contrastive Divergence (PCD) algorithms for the purpose of network anomaly detection. This study evaluated the performance with the IDS2012 dataset collected in 2010 [33] , which is a predecessor of the IDS2017 dataset employed in our evaluation. The reported accuracy is ranged between 88-89%. The work in [34] presented an ensemble method by adopting multiple learners using a variety of algorithms including a Self-Organization Map (SOM) Artificial Neural Network (ANN). The evaluation was conducted only with the NSL-KDD dataset, and ANN does not show any better performance than the other shallow learning techniques employed.
As summarized, there were several past studies that utilized deep learning techniques for network anomaly detection. However, the past work simply introduced a single deep learning model without extensive comparison. In this work, we set up a set of deep learning models based on Fully Connected Network (FCN) [23] , Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) [24] , and Sequence-to-Sequence (Seq2Seq) [25] - [27] structures. In addition, the previous studies largely relied on the KDDCup 1999 and its variant (NSL-KDD) datasets only, which would raise a question that their techniques can work well in different environments. For this purpose, we employ five different datasets with unique characteristics to make thorough evaluation.
C. DESCRIPTION OF DATASETS
This section provides a brief description of the datasets used in this research. 1) KDD CUP 1999 DATASET [35] AND NSL-KDD [10] The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was collected from a simulated military network environment over nine weeks. It contains various intrusions including R2L (unauthorized access from a remote machine), U2R (unauthorized access to local root privileges), probing (surveillance and other probing), and DOS (denial-of-service). Each data point in the dataset includes the connection information with 41 features plus the associated label, which can be used to distinguish attack connections from the normal traffic.
NSL-KDD is a refined version of the KDD Cup 1999 data that filters out a number of duplicated records to reduce the bias in the classification. NSL-KDD contains two files for training (''Train+'' and ''Train-'') and two other files for testing (''Test+'' and ''Test-''). Note that Train-and Test-are subsets of Train+ and Test+, respectively, to give different degrees of difficulty in classification. The size of data files is as follows: Train+ (125,973 records), Test+ (22,544 records), Train- (25,192 records) , and Test-(11,850 records). The distributions of normal and anomalous connections are fairly well balanced in the range of 46% -82% in the dataset.
2) KYOTO UNIVERSITY HONEYPOT DATASET (KYOTO-HONEYPOT) [28]
Kyoto Honeypot is a daily-based evaluation dataset since 2009 for network anomaly detection. This dataset includes a number of data points collected and analyzed through honeypots. Due to this reason, it is highly unbalanced and the vast majority of the data is for attacks (97% of the entire data). The number of features is 24 in total (14 basic and 10 extended features). For this dataset, we excluded 6 minor features related to the host and port information in our experiments.
3) UNSW-NB15 DATASET [17] Similar to KDD Cup 1999, the UNSW-NB15 dataset was collected from a simulated environment in 2015. A set of servers generate traffic in the network, and a set of routers create pcap files as the capture of packets. Then Bro-IDS 1 classifies the captured data to construct the label information. The number of features is 49 for a single data point, with the associated label information. The total number of records is over two million in four CSV files, and the dataset also offers a training set and testing set for the evaluation purpose.
4) IDS2017 DATASET [29]
This IDS2017 dataset also provides the labeled connection data for the network intrusion detection research. The data was captured from Monday, July 3, 2017 to Friday July 7, 2017. from a testbed system with two networks, one for attacks and the other for victims. The dataset contains a set of attacks, including DoS, Web attack, infiltration attack, botnet attack, port scan, and so forth, in addition to the normal traffic. The first day data contains the normal traffic only, while the 1 https://www.bro.org/ data for the other days have attacks. Each data point contains 85 features including the label, and the number of data points is over 2.8 million. [30] MAWI is a collection of network traffic traces captured from a link between Japan and the USA since 2001 [36] [37] . The MAWILab logs contain the attack information collected from multiple intrusion detections systems against the captured packets. In our previous work [38] , we combined the captured packet traces with the IDS logs to generate the labeled data for network anomaly detection. A single day trace contains the packets captured in the 15-minute interval, and the number of data points for a day is tens of millions. For the day of August 27, 2017, for example, a five-second data contains roughly 400,000 data points on average.
5) MAWILAB DATASET

III. DEEP LEARNING MODELS
In this section, we present a set of deep learning models established based on the FCN, VAE, and Seq2Seq structures. FCN is a simple form of neural networks. We also consider VAE to see if the dimension reduction by the auto-encoding function would be beneficial to deal with the network-related data. In addition, we include Seq2Seq with LSTM cells with the power to convert input features to context vectors as will be described in detail next. Table 2 summarizes the symbols and notations commonly used for the mathematical formulas for machine learning models. 
A. FCN MODEL
The fundamental concept of machine learning is based on the following mathematical formula [39] :
where H (x) is a hypothesis, x indicates input data, W and b denote weights and bias, respectively. The main goal of learning a neural network using the above formula as a linear regression model is to find a set of the optimized network parameters which minimize a cost function. The most popular algorithm used to minimize the cost function for the linear regression model is gradient descent, and this can be denoted as: where m is the total number of x input data, and x (i) and y (i) denote the i-th input data and i-th output (or prediction). Note that two formulas above are the fundamental concept of a multi-variable linear regression and multinomial logistic regression. Yet, machine learning based on the concept above results in one main issue which cannot linearly separate the exclusive-OR (XOR) gate. To address this problem, back-propagation was proposed as a solution, which is the chain rule-based algorithm [23] , [40] . Back-propagation is the main idea of FCN. The basic concept of FCN is to learn non-linear combinations of given data based on matrix multiplications, and every neuron in fully connected layers is connected to each other. For network anomaly detection, we design a deep learning model based on the FCN structure. Figure 2 shows the overview of our FCN-based anomaly detection model. The first step in this model is data preprocessing for normalization and transformation. Numerical features are normalized using MinMax scaling, while categorical features are encoded as a set of dummy numerical values using one-hot encoding. The model then passes the pre-processed data to the fully connected network for training. To overcome the vanishing gradient problem, Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is used as an activation function, and the Softmax layer with a cross entropy cost function is added to produce two dimensional outputs, i.e., either normal or attack.
B. VAE MODELS (WITH/WITHOUT A BACKEND FCN)
Autoencoder is a reconstruction-based neural network [24] which is composed of encoder and decoder. If one hidden layer is given, Eq. 3 indicates that the encoder maps the original input vector x to the latent representation z:
where σ is an activation function such as sigmoid and ReLU, and W and b are the weight and bias, respectively. The decoder maps z back to x for the purpose of reconstruction:
where σ , W , and b are an activation function, weight, and bias for the decoder.
The main goal here is to minimize a reconstruction error by finding the minimal difference between x and x ; that is, the reconstruction error is computed by:
VAE is a variation of the basic auto-encoder structure. VAE additionally refers to a generative, multi-layered, and directed probabilistic graphical model. The key concept is to infer q(z|x; φ) and p(x |z; θ), where q(z|x; φ) is the likelihood of the latent variable z given the data x, and p(x |z; θ ) is the likelihood of the data x given the latent variable z. Note that z is the starting point of the generative process, and φ and θ are the parameters updated in the training phase.
One of the important functions in VAE is to calculate the marginal likelihood of data, which is the sum over the marginal likelihood of individual data points, denoted as:
Alternatively, Eq. 6 can be denoted as Eq. 7:
where q(z|x; φ) and p(z; θ ) are the approximate posterior and prior distribution of z, respectively, KL is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, and L(θ , φ, x (i) ) is the variational lower bound on the marginal likelihood of the i-th data point. Since the KL divergence is always higher than a zero [24] [41] [42] , it can be rewritten as follows:
Here, E q(z|x (i) ;φ) describes the reconstruction error, and KL (q(z|x (i) ; φ) || p(z; θ )) indicates the similarity between the approximate posterior and prior distribution of z. One important precondition here is that both q(z|x (i) ; φ) and p(z; θ ) have a form of the normal distribution. Furthermore, if binarybased data is given, Bernoulli distribution needs to be used for the distribution of the likelihood p(x|z; θ ).
With the VAE concept, we implement two models for network anomaly detection: VAE-Pure is a simple VAE model (Figure 3(a) ), whereas VAE-FCN connects a VAE to a fully connected neural network at the end (Figure 3(b) ). For VAE-Pure, the labels are treated as an independent feature in our design. In detail, actual labels are included in the training phase and the value of the label is randomly chosen to have a form of the normal distribution (µ = 0 and σ = 1) in the testing phase. This VAE model performs learning to regenerate the labels out of the provided random values. The motivation why the VAE-Pure model includes the labels in the training phase is to see if it would be possible to predict the appropriate label in the reconstruction phase as an independent feature by the auto-encoder function.
VAE-FCN in Figure 3 (b) is almost identical to the previous one (Figure 3(a) ) except that this VAE model performs learning in an unsupervised manner by regenerating the dataset and learning through the loss function. A separate FCN with 1 hidden layer (ReLU activation) and 1 Softmax layer is attached to this VAE model. This FCN receives inputs from the probability distribution of z and produces label probabilities as the output. Both of the VAE and the attached FCN are trained together in this model.
C. SEQ2SEQ MODEL
Another model we establish for network anomaly detection utilizes the Sequence-to-Sequence (Seq2Seq) structure which is composed of two RNNs corresponding to the encoder and decoder. Both encoder and decoder can have a single or multiple cells, which could be Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) or Gate Recurrent Unit (GRU). We simply chose LSTM for the memory cells in our Seq2Seq model since LSTM is powerful to overcome the vanishing gradient problem [43] . Figure 4 shows the Seq2Seq model designed in this work.
In the Seq2Seq architecture, all the inputs are encoded into a fixed-size vector, and the encoded vector is the only one which is passed to the decoder. Hence, the goal of Seq2Seq is to yield a target sequence (y T ) and conditional probability (p(y T |x T )) through the architecture [25] , [26] . The definition of the notations is as follows: The main objective of the encoder is to read x = {x 1 , x 2 , ...x T } into c sequentially, and the first two conditions refer to the encoder. Eq. 9 is applied to the encoder to update the hidden state, and the LSTM as a non-linear function f is used:
where h t is a new state, f w (·) is a function with the parameters of h t−1 and x t . Here h t−1 is an old state and x t is an input vector at a time step. The decoder associated with the last condition trains a model to predict y T with given c and {y 1 , y 2 , ...y t−1 }, and a conditional probability P(y|x) is computed by the following equation:
where p(y t |c, y 1 , y 2 , ...y T −1 ) is a distribution represented with the Softmax function. The LSTM cell shown in Figure 4 is basically composed of three gates: input, forget, and output. The details about how each gate is updated can be found from [44] . As mentioned, GRU could be configured instead of LSTM, but we simply chose LSTM for our Seq2Seq model.
Here are some details of the implementation of our Seq2Seq model for network anomaly detection. As mentioned, we chose LSTM for the memory cells to construct the Seq2Seq model. We considered one and three cells for the LSTM stack in our experiments and observed that configuring three cells works much better with little increase of learning complexity. It is possible to add more cells in the stack, but our observation tells that three cells would be enough with the excellent performance (over 99% of accuracy in detection). For this reason, we set it to three by default. The output of the previous LSTM layer (denoted as t − 1) is supplied to the subsequent LSTM layer in the decoder at time t. In the figure, the ''Go'' signal indicates the input in the decoder as a tensor in TensorFlow. Once the LSTM stack in the decoder is executed, it produces the probability for normal and anomalous, and the model picks the greater one as the classification decision. The loss function used is Mean Squared Error.
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate the deep learning models presented in the previous section. In this section, we report the experimental results performed with the public datasets: NSL-KDD, Kyoto-Honeypot, UNSW-NB15, IDS2017, and MAWILab datasets.
A. EVALUATION METRICS
We employ a set of metrics that are widely accepted in practice for evaluating classification performance. The confusion matrix is a table, in which the elements are referenced to measure the performance of a classification model. The elements in the matrix are as follows: 
F-measure is a harmonic mean of the precision and recall of the test. While widely employed for evaluating classification performance, F-measure might lead to a biased result if the dataset is critically skewed. Alternatively, the measure of Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC) is a useful tool to estimate the quality of binary classification even for a biased dataset [45] , the value of which is ranged from −1.0 (poor) to 1.0 (good). MCC is defined as follows:
We report our experimental results with the metrics defined above. In particular, we use MCC to report the experimental results conducted against the Kyoto-Honeypot dataset since it is significantly skewed with only a small number of normal instances (∼3%).
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AGAINST THE NSL-KDD DATASET
In this first experiment, we report training time to measure the learning complexity and F-measure for the performance of classification. F-measure (also known as F1-score) combines precision and recall and is widely used for measuring classification performance.
We experimented with a set of hyper-parameter configurations as follows and report the best result for each model: the experiment was conducted on a dedicated machine in the Google cloud. Figure 5(a) shows the time taken (in seconds) to construct the learning model for each of the training files. The figure shows VAE-Pure < FCN < Seq2Seq, with respect to the cost of learning. The Seq2Seq model shows a little greater overhead than FCN and VAE-Pure, but the training cost is quite manageable (i.e., less than 25 seconds for over 125K data points in Train+). Although not shown in the figure, the Seq2Seq model with a single cell in the LSTM stack shows a slightly smaller learning time compared to one with three cells in the stack but the gap is not significant (22% at max). Finally, VAE-FCN shows a high degree of training overhead for Train+, whereas the overhead is less than Seq2Seq for Train-(consisting of 25K data points). This implies that VAE-FCN would be limited with respect to scalability. Figure 5(b) shows the performance for binary classification. From the figure, the Seq2Seq model shows a very promising performance (>99.9% of F-measure), regardless of the combinations of the datasets. In fact, the results are much better than what we observed from the experiment with conventional techniques shown in Table 1 . FCN shows somewhat consistent results over 86% of F-measure, outperforming the conventional learning techniques. The VAE-class models do not show better performance than FCN, yielding 72%-90% of F-measure. 
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AGAINST THE KYOTO-HONEYPOT DATASET
As summarized in Section II-A, Kyoto-Honeypot contains a large amount of daily connection data gathered through honeypots since 2009. In our experiments, we selected a subset of data without any preference other than the 2-year gap for the training and testing datasets, not to choose too close data temporally for the learning and actual classification. Table 3 shows the information of the data selected.
As discussed earlier, the data is significantly skewed and 97% of the records are the data points for attacks, as the collection took place in honeypots. Due to this severe imbalance with respect to the fractions of normal and attack data points, we do not rely only on F-measure to measure the performance because it could lead to a critical bias otherwise. For example, if a model in evaluation simply classifies all the data points into attack, the resulted F-measure would still be around 97%. For this reason, we employ MCC to report the experimental results conducted against this highly skewed dataset.
The hyper-parameter configurations used in the experiments are as follows: We now report the experimental results against the Kyoto-Honeypot data. We observed as follows for training a one-day data (including 268K records): FCN (3.93 sec), VAE-Pure (3.87 sec), VAE-FCN (6.54 sec), and Seq2Seq (9.20 sec). We can see that the training cost is not much expensive even with a single dedicated server. As shown in Figure 5 (a), Seq2Seq sometimes requires a greater amount of time for training than VAE-FCN, but it does not show a high degree of variance depending on input data unlike VAE-FCN.
We next report the performance of the deep learning models. Table 4 shows the measured performance against a daily VOLUME 7, 2019 data (December 1st, 2016) with a set of measures. As can be seen from the table, Seq2Seq consistently outperforms showing almost perfect performance. The F-measure shows that the models seem to be working well, but we can see that the MCC values are far from 1.0 other than the Seq2Seq model. In particular, the VAE models show less than 0.2 for MCC, which is unacceptable. VAE-FCN works better than VAE-Pure, but it still shows a significantly high FP rate (55.2%, not shown in the table due to space reasons). FCN outperforms the VAE models. The F-measure of FCN is quite high (0.93), but it shows a low score of MCC = 0.37.
We also conducted a set of experiments against the entire data collected in December 2015 on a daily basis, and Table 5 reports the measured MCC values over the month. Here, ''Average'' is the aggregated MCC over the 31 days, while ''Best'' and ''Worst'' are the best/worst result out of 31 days. The Seq2Seq model works consistently, and Worst is still 1.0 (perfect). Overall, FCN works better than the VAE models as observed in the previous section.
D. EVALUATION WITH UNSW-NB15 AND IDS2017 DATASETS
We next report the experimental results conducted with the UNSW-NB15 [17] and IDS2017 [29] datasets. UNSW-NB15 provides a pair of training and testing data files, the size of which are training = 82K and testing = 175K, in terms of the number of data points. The IDS2017 dataset consists of 5-day traces from Monday to Friday, and daily trace records include no or only a subset of attacks selectively. Therefore, for example, if we use the first day trace for training, we cannot build a model for any attack because it does not contain any attack record at all. The second day trace contains FTP and SSH attacks but nothing about DoS/DDoS, Web, and infiltration attacks that are found in the rest of the days. For this reason, we sampled ten sets of 100K data points at random, out of which five files are used for training and the other five files are for testing. The data files were then pre-processed for the normalization for the numeric features and for the one-hot encoding for the categorical features. Table 6 shows a summary of the results. The table compares the performance of the deep learning models (FCN and Seq2Seq) and the shallow learning methods (SVM and RF). Due to the poor performance, we discarded the VAE models for the subsequent experiments. For UNSW-NB15, we can see that the Seq2Seq classifier consistently outperforms the other learning methods. However, FCN shows a worse performance than SVM and RF in F1-score; it shows a higher accuracy but also shows a high degree of false positive rate, degrading the overall performance. RF works better than SVM and FCN with this dataset.
The result for IDS2017 is averaged out from the five independent experiments, as mentioned above. Similar with the result collected using UNSW-NB15, Seq2Seq outperforms the other methods for IDS2017. FCN works pretty well with the higher performance in F1-score than RF and SVM; it shows a higher rate for Recall than Precision like the result with UNSW-NB15, which indicates that this classifier tends to strictly classify the samples in testing into anomalies. For RF and SVM, we observed a very high degree of variations from the individual experiments, and the standard deviation is 16.9% (SVM) and 4.7% (RF), while it is less than 0.11% for both FCN and Seq2Seq. This implies that the deep learning models work more in a consistent manner.
E. EVALUATION WITH A MAWILAB TRACE
Finally, we report our experimental results against the MAW-ILab data. We chose the trace collected on August 27th, 2017 without any preference. A daily trace contains 15-minute packet data collected on that day. We split the trace chosen into a set of small files in a disjoint manner, each of which contains the packets for five seconds, and we used the first five sub-data for our experiments. As shown in Table 7 , the first file is used for training and the subsequent four files were utilized for testing. The table also provides the information about the fraction of normal and anomaly data points.
For learning and testing, we considered the following five features: protocol, TCP flags, number of packets, number of bytes, and duration. The total number of features after one-hot encoding is 23. We assumed epochs = 20 and learning rate = 1e-02 as the default setting in the experiments.
In this experiment, we focused on the performance of the Seq2Seq model to see if it consistently yields a high degree of detection accuracy. Figure 6 compares the performance of the shallow learning models (SVM and RF) and the deep learning models (FCN and Seq2Seq) against the MAWILab dataset. As can be seen from the figure, the deep learning models work better than the shallow learning models. While FCN produces 77%-84% of F-measure, Seq2Seq works consistently across the testing sets showing 100% accuracy. Figure 7 shows the impact of the learning rate for the Seq2Seq model against the MAWILab data. As can be seen from the figure, Seq2Seq works highly consistently if the learning rate is not too small. However, it degrades significantly with the very small learning rate of 1e-05. We also measured the impact of epochs with a set of epochs = {10, 20, 40, 80}, and observed no significant impact.
In sum, the deep learning model based on the Seq2Seq structure with LSTM works very well for network anomaly detection, consistently yielding over 99% of detection accuracy over the diverse datasets with different characteristics. For cross-validation, the implementation of the deep learning models presented in this paper is available at https://github.com/dcstamuc/NetworkAnomaly.
V. CONCLUSION
While machine learning has widely been applied to various applications in different domains, few studies exist that examined deep learning for the study of network anomaly detection in depth. In this work, we claimed why deep learning would be a good choice for effective network anomaly detection by showing the non-linearity of network traffic data. To evaluate the potential of deep learning, we established a set of deep learning models based on FCN, VAE, Seq2Seq structures, and examined the constructed models with a diverse set of public traffic datasets including NSL-KDD, Kyoto-Honeypot, UNSW-NB15, IDS2017, and MAW-ILab. Our experimental results are interesting and the model based on the Seq2Seq structure shows the highly promising performance yielding over 99% of accuracy to identify network anomalies across the entire datasets.
In this study, we reported the best performance for each model from the results obtained with a set of hyper-parameter configurations. How to tune the parameters is an important task and we plan to investigate to address this problem as one of the future tasks. This study also assumed a relatively small number of hidden layers (1 or 3) for the deep learning structures, and extensive evaluations with a greater number of layers will be one of the interesting future tasks. In addition, this evaluation study does not include the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) structure, and examining the feasibility of CNNs for network anomaly detection would also be interesting for future investigation.
